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FATA’s Political Status 




In this article the author shares her research from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) 
of Pakistan where she travelled and conducted interviews. The Constitution of Pakistan governs 
FATA through the colonial system established by the British in 1901, which is different from the 
rest of Pakistan’s governance structure. As a result the region became isolated and militants reigned 
free until military operations were conducted in the area. In order to prevent this from happening 
again the government has to integrate FATA with the rest of Pakistan. The author examines several 
alternatives available to the government of Pakistan to address FATA’s political status. Merging of 
the tribal areas with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is analyzed against a separate provincial status for FATA. 




The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan are the epicenter of the “War on 
Terror.” The tumultuous region served as a base for the militants launching attacks within the 
country as well as against the governments, militaries, and civilians of the US, Afghanistan, and 
others. After the 9/11 attacks, Pakistan joined the US-led “War on Terror” and severed ties with the 
Taliban. In order to eliminate the threat of terrorism emanating from there, the military set foot in 
the region for the first time in 2002. Pakistan presently has 140,000 troops on the ground in FATA 
and military operations have been conducted in six of the seven agencies with the exception of 
North Waziristan.77  
The military operations eliminated Taliban control, subdued the group’s fighting ability and set up 
the government’s writ in the tribal areas. To make FATA an integral part of Pakistan, the colonial 
governance system established by the British in 1901 needs to be replaced. 
The root of the problem is that FATA has a special political status as a “tribal territory” and is 
different from the rest of Pakistan; basic governing bodies like the police, judiciary, and civic 
amenities do not exist in this area. Subsequently, economic development failed to reach FATA, thus 
keeping the area isolated and impoverished. The extremely low standards of education and 
development have left the people vulnerable to militants. FATA residents want the comforts and 
security that accompany conventional systems of governance. The absence of state governance has 
created a gap in the system and allowed militants to thrive in the region.  
This article analyzes FATA’s status problem in depth, beginning with a description of its colonial 
governance system. Historical events that shaped FATA’s condition are explained and the paper 
ends with choices available to the government in order to bring FATA under the same governance 	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structure as the rest of Pakistan. Options considered include: revival of the traditional tribal system 
of governance, implementation of President Zardari’s reforms in the tribal areas, a separate 
provincial status, and the merger of FATA with the already established province of Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa. In conclusion, a separate status will be recommended for FATA, making it the fifth 
province of Pakistan.  
 
Governance of FATA 
FATA is a group of administrative units in northwest Pakistan and consists of 7 agencies. These 
agencies are Khyber, Mohmand, Bajaur, Orakzai, Kurram, North Waziristan, and South Waziristan. 
The tribal areas are located in a narrow belt running along the Durand Line, the disputed de facto 
border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. FATA and Afghanistan share 1500 miles of this porous 
border in largely unmarked mountainous terrain.  
The Tribal Areas and Afghanistan were a buffer zone between the British and the Russian Empires 
in the 19th century.78 The British could not enforce their writ upon the tribal area. Exhausted by 
repeated battles with the tribes, the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) was introduced in an effort to 
subdue them.79 The FCR was a special governing system for the tribal region only; civil and criminal 
laws were different than the ones enforced in the rest of British India. The Political Agents (PA) and 
the Maliki system were also developed to allow for greater colonial control and will be further 
discussed in succeeding paragraphs.  
After Pakistan’s independence from India in 1947 it was cheaper for the government to stick with 
the British system than replace it with a new system. Some 30 instruments of accession were 
subsequently signed in 1948 granting the tribal areas a special administrative status.80 Under article 
247 of the Constitution, the President of Pakistan is the chief executive for FATA who in turn 
administers it through the Governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly known as NWFP). The 
Governor has this special power due to the proximity of the tribal areas near Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. 
This form of government was mutually agreed to at the explicit request of the tribes. The tribes 
pledged loyalty to Pakistan in return for maintaining their own identity, for securing the Western 
Border and not allowing any hostile agency to function within its territories. The tribes that inhabit 
the areas are fiercely independent and were peaceful until the fall of the Taliban in neighboring 
Afghanistan.  
 
Frontier Crime Regulation  
The FCR is based upon tribal customs (rivaj) and the Pashtun code of ethics known as Pashtunwali. 
The FCR relies upon the concept of “collective responsibility,” according to which an entire tribe or 
sub-tribe can be held accountable for the actions of a single wrongdoer. Since the FCR resulted in 
gross human rights violations it came to be known as the “black law.” This method of law 	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enforcement has been criticized by some segments of the tribes and human rights organizations. 
The Pakistan Supreme Court has deemed it unconstitutional.   
 
Maliks and Political Agents  
Each agency in FATA is administered by a Political Agent. As provided in the Constitution, the 
Governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa appoints Political Agents in FATA and they represent the 
Governor in their respective agencies. The tribes operate through their Maliks (tribal and village 
elders) who can be selected by the tribes themselves or selected by the Political Agent of each 
agency. Political Agents do not directly rule or administer, but they work with the Maliks to 
influence the tribes’ decisions and behavior. The Political Agents provide money, infrastructure 
support and other incentives to the Maliks in exchange for cooperation; they maintain law and order 
in their tribal region with the help of jirgas. They also have the power to enforce collective 
punishment through the FCR.  
 
Jirga  
A jirga holds the status of a court in the tribal areas of Pakistan. It consists of a tribal assembly of 
elders who make decisions by consensus. Since the parliament and the judiciary are not recognized 
in FATA, the authority lies with the jirga. It is similar to that of a city council meeting in the US, 
where important local matters are discussed among the leaders of the community. A jirga is selected 
by consensus and given an open decree; its decision is accepted by all parties. After hearing from the 
parties in dispute and examining the evidence, the jirga issues punishment. The jirga can grant a 
death sentence, stoning in case of adultery, or dismissal from the community. 
 
The effects of foreign influence 
FATA was heavily changed following US efforts to arm the Afghan mujahideen against the Soviet 
army in the 1980s. Operation Cyclone remains the longest and most expensive CIA covert operation 
to date. Military equipment, including anti-aircraft weapons such as Stinger missiles, and paramilitary 
officers from the Special Activities Division (SAD) were supplied to the Afghan mujahideen during 
the Soviet war in Afghanistan. Initially the funding began at $20 to $30 million dollars in 1980 and 
increased to $630 million dollars a year in 1987. 81  This controversial covert operation was 
undertaken to draw the Soviets into a long and costly Vietnam like war.82 The US reached out to 
Pakistan’s fundamentalist dictator, Zia-ul-Haq, to garner support for the mission. Operation Cyclone 
relied heavily on Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) for funds and weapons distribution, 
providing military training and support to the Afghan mujahideen.  
American aid to the region was quickly cut following the collapse of the Soviet Union.83 However, in 
Afghanistan, Jalaluddin Haqqani and Osama bin Laden still controlled a vast number of radical 	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freedom fighters. Afghanistan plunged into chaos. This created an opening which was filled by the 
Taliban, and eventually the al Qaeda terrorist organization. As the staging area for Operation 
Cyclone, FATA was left with a destroyed system, the world’s largest refugee population, radical 
Islam, drugs and weapons.84   
The links to the deadly events of 9/11 were deeply rooted in the Soviet-Afghan war. The US now 
finds itself fighting against the very movement it helped arm, in a region that is still impaired by 
chaos three decades later. Few places in the world assumed as much importance for the US and its 
allies since 2001 as Pakistan's tribal areas. Pakistan joined the 'War on Terror' and immediately 
deployed 80,000 troops along the western border to capture or kill Taliban and al Qaeda militants 
fleeing from Afghanistan. The entry of coalition forces into Afghanistan led to the conflict spilling 
over into FATA. Drone strikes and Pakistan military operations in the tribal area followed suit and 
triggered 980,000 FATA residents to relocate to other parts of Pakistan. 85  The war took a heavy toll 
on the economy and terrorist violence became a daily part of life in Pakistan.  
 
 
Radicalization and the origin of the Taliban movement 
The Taliban movement developed and formed from Afghan orphans and refugees who abandoned 
their homes and fled to Pakistan after the Soviet invasion. Saudi donations led to a sudden increase 
in the number of madrassas during the Afghan jihad against the Soviets. A new kind of madrassa 
emerged in the Pakistan-Afghanistan region with teachings strictly focused on making war on 
infidels.86 Back then the Soviet Union was the enemy; today it is the United States. Many of the 
Taliban were educated in the Saudi-financed madrassas in Pakistan. Madrassas used the Islamic 
ideology as a way of creating an army of anti-communist guerilla fighters. Facing a bleak future, 
Afghani parents often resorted to sending their sons to madrassas. The promise of free education 
and food proved difficult to resist. The Taliban’s swift rise to power was the result of the disorder 
and civil war that ensued following the complete breakdown of law and order in Afghanistan after 
the Soviet retreat.87  
 
Rise of the mullahs and the mujahideen commanders 
Religion is a major part of FATA’s identity today, but it had been subservient to tribal culture before 
1980. The US, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia support for an anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan 
subsequently altered the governance structure in FATA. During this time, mujahideen commanders 
and mullahs (Islamic clerics) emerged to weaken the traditional governance model in the tribal areas. 
The military commanders who were at the forefront of the jihad against the Soviets became 
increasingly powerful because of their leadership skills and capability as fighters. The mullahs, who 	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were disregarded and mocked before the Soviet invasion, gained influence because of the religious 
motivation they provided for the war. The power of the commanders and mullahs grew stronger yet 
with the large sums of money channeled in by the US and Saudi Arabia through Pakistan. The 
Political Agents and the Maliks were no longer the sole power brokers in FATA. 
 
Spread of Afghan militants into FATA 
The situation in FATA took a turn for the worse when US and NATO forces invaded Afghanistan 
in October 2001. This led to the spillover of militancy from Afghanistan into FATA, with thousands 
of militants from the Afghan Taliban and the Arab al Qaeda rushing in. Foreign affiliates of these 
groups—including Uzbeks, Chechens, and Tajiks—also came to the tribal areas in order to establish 
bases to carry on their fight against the coalition forces in Afghanistan.88  The local tribes who 
believed in the cause provided support to the fighters, while local militants who were allied with the 
Afghan Taliban before 9/11 began to form local Taliban groups. 
 
Rise of militant influence in FATA 
For the first time in the history of the country, the Pakistan army set foot into FATA which changed 
the dynamics of the political administration in FATA once again. The military authorities started 
dealing directly with the militants and their tribal intermediary. The Political Agents was sidelined, 
thus losing their influence and credibility. In the process the tribes and their Maliks could not stand 
up against the armed and organized militants.89 Initially the tribes in FATA opted for peace deals 
with the government of Pakistan. One after another the peace deals failed and the militants 
beheaded around 300 Maliks while accusing them of collaborating with the Pakistani army and 
intelligence services.90  
After the invasion of Afghanistan, militancy and violence gradually found roots in FATA and started 
to spread towards urban areas. Pakistan deployed the largest number of troops in the world to fight 
the spread of terrorism, 140,000 in total.91 Compare this figure to 140,000 coalition forces in 
Afghanistan made up of troops from 48 countries.92 Attacks inside Pakistan dramatically increased as 
the army continued its operations against the Taliban in FATA. Over 30,000 Pakistanis have 
perished as a result of terrorist violence in the country.93 Even though militant groups from other 
parts of the country also participated in these attacks, FATA became the chief supplier of suicide 
bombers. 	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In addition, the use of Predator drones and Hellfire missiles against selected militant leaders in 
FATA, in cooperation with the Pakistani forces, have led to increased anti-US sentiments in the 
country. The War on Terror came to be perceived by the common man as an American war. The 
credibility of Pakistan’s government came into question and the Taliban began running schools in 
which children as young as 9 were being conditioned to become suicide bombers. They were taught 
that “the Pakistan army is the ally of the Western capitalist world; they are the enemies of Islam.”94  
 
Lack of development in FATA  
Militancy in FATA was fueled by several contributing factors. FATA is the least developed area of 
Pakistan. Illiteracy and poverty are severe; the literacy rate is estimated to be as low as 29 percent 
among men, and only 3 percent among women.95 The extremely low standards of education and 
development have left the people vulnerable to militants. Lack of infrastructure provides limited 
career opportunities. There is also an acute shortage of basic amenities like health care and drinking 
water. Catastrophic floods worsened the situation and caused an even further increase in the number 
of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).  
 
Options available to address FATA’s governance challenge 
There are several alternatives available to Pakistan regarding the political status of FATA. Residents 
of FATA have made demands to be converted into a fifth province of Pakistan. On the other hand 
some Government officials are considering expanding one of the four provinces of Pakistan, 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, to absorb FATA as well. Maintenance of status quo has also been proposed 
but with some key changes such as abolishment of the FCR. A revival of the Political Agent and 
Malik system has even been mentioned.  
These alternatives are evaluated using three criteria: political acceptability, enforcement and 
effectiveness. The policy alternatives will be measured against their acceptability, the degree to which 
Pakistan’s government is able to implement the policy, and the alternative’s ability to effectively 
tackle the economic problems in FATA, along with countering the spread of militancy and 
radicalization.  
Maintenance of Status Quo: In the midst of the current political, economic, energy and security 
crisis, the government of Pakistan continues to neglect FATA. The status quo is an isolated FATA 
with a deteriorated and corrupt governing system where the maliks and political agents were 
sidelined by the militants first and then by the Pakistan military. In addition to sever poverty, the 
dismal state of infrastructure provides limited opportunities. The discouraging human development 
indicators show that the status quo is not a feasible option because it has alienated the local 
population and robbed the youth of an education and a future.  
Enforcement of this option is without question since no new action will be required. The continued 
destabilization of the Pakistan government is what causes this policy alternative to be unacceptable. 	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Status quo is not effective in dealing with FATA’s militancy, radicalization and economic troubles 
because it was this broken tribal system which originally allowed terrorists to flourish in the tribal 
areas.  
Implementation of President Zardari’s reforms in FATA: In 2008 President Zardari announced 
political, administrative and judicial reforms to be introduced in FATA. The proposed reforms 
included setting up a FATA Tribunal with powers similar to those of the high court. The right to 
appeal cases regarding the FCR would be provided through the establishment of the court of 
appeals. This would limit the power of political agents to hold an entire tribe responsible for the 
actions of a single person. Under the reforms, funds provided to the political agents for use in the 
region would be reviewed by the Auditor General of Pakistan. The reforms also allow political 
parties to function in the region. Under the current system, development funds in FATA are utilized 
by the provincial government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa but the people of FATA have no 
representation in the provincial assembly. This deprives them of the right to hold their leaders 
accountable.  
Implementation of these reforms will not alter FATA’s political status, which is the crux of the 
problem. Despite amending the FCR and allowing political parties to function in the tribal areas, 
these reforms provide no solution for the economic woes of FATA and continue to consider it a 
tribal territory of Pakistan. On the positive side, political acceptability of this option is better than 
the status quo; it gives the people something rather than nothing. Enforcement of this alternative 
would, however, prove complicated since FATA will remain a tribal territory with FCR but the 
people will have the right to appeal the ruling. The limited scope of these reforms would be less 
effective in addressing the problems in FATA in comparison to more comprehensive options.  
Revival of the political agents and maliks in the short term: The harsh terrain and the 
population straddling the porous border with Afghanistan will require immense resources to 
establish an effective administrative and law enforcement system in FATA. While researching 
possible solutions to turmoil in the area, I interviewed the Governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 
Owais Ahmed Ghani, at his office in Peshawar.96 Governor Ghani said that these resources will not 
be available soon. In his view, it is important to sustain the tribes in the short term through 
restoration of the traditional role of the political agent by strengthening their power and authority in 
their respective agency. He also emphasized the importance of reviving the malik system so that they 
can develop the tribes’ capacity to deliver collective and territorial responsibility.  
The political agent and malik system worked before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan but even 
then it failed to bring any development to the region and FATA remained the least developed part 
of Pakistan. This alternative is not politically acceptable or effective because the tribal system of 
political agents and maliks did not prevent the rise of Islamic militancy in the region; the Taliban 
destroyed the system by taking their place. Al Qaeda and the Taliban must be removed from their 
position of power before peace can possibly flourish. Even if the maliks can one day be restored to 
power, they have not demonstrated the ability to develop the infrastructure and living conditions of 
FATA. Solving FATA’s lack of governance and its side effects will require measures above and 
beyond restoration of solutions which have been historically proven as inadequate. Enforcement of 
this policy will face an uphill battle due to a broad lack of faith in political agents and maliks. Many 
residents consider them corrupt relics of the tribal governing system.  
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Merger of FATA with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa: Historically the administration of Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa and FATA has remained interwoven with each other. Many people from FATA are 
already residing in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and they speak the same language, although the dialects 
differ. The Governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is the president’s agent in the tribal areas and political 
parties such as the Awami National Party (ANP) have already demanded FATA’s merger with 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. On the other hand, many political parties and tribal elders demand a separate 
province. “We will never support FATA’s merger with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa,” said Pakistan 
People’s Party Tribal Areas President Waris Khan.97  
During an interview with Major General Tariq Khan of the Inspector General Frontier Corp 
(IGFC) at the Frontier Corp headquarters in Peshawar, he posed “if there were violent reactions to 
calling the province Paktunkhwa and Hazara wanted to separate then what do you think is going to 
happen if the FATA status changes through unilateral means and then it is forced to merge to 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa? FATA is very proud of its tribal heritage, its unique independence and would 
go into a civil war situation if forced to give up these privileges without an autonomous standing i.e. 
separate provincial status.”   
The social makeup of the people of FATA is considerably different from that of Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa; merging the two would be difficult and might lead to a civil war. FATA residents will 
oppose being ruled from Peshawar and the government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is already stretched 
thin due to struggles with terrorism and limited resources. The added pressure of governing FATA 
is more than can reasonably be asked of the struggling neighbor. Residents of FATA also fear that 
integration with another province will lead to a bleak allocation of development funds for FATA 
based on the already weak financial position of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. While more funds are 
expected to be allocated to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in the event of its expansion, no such plans have 
been announced as of yet. Currently, the Pakistan government is using US aid money to construct 
roads in FATA.98  
Geographical proximity of the two areas does provide a reason to consider a merger. The united 
territory would provide easy access to all the tribal agencies currently dependent on Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa for their logistics and provisions. A merger could also make it easier to manage the 
tense rivalries between the tribes of the region. The Wazir and Mahsud tribes of South Waziristan 
are unlikely to form an alliance in the near term due to ongoing discord. Khyber agency is home to a 
vicious feud between the different sects of Sunni Islam. Orakzai and Kurram Agencies suffer from 
sectarian strife between Shias and Sunnis. Decisions made by the provincial government of Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa might be more acceptable to all the tribes than the Governor of the new province of 
FATA, whom they might view as favoring one tribe over the other. 
The political acceptability of this option is high amongst the political parties in Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa who wish to establish a massive Pashtun province.99 If the tribal areas are merged with 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa then a Pashtun majority province will be born. The current political 	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administration of FATA is already tied to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through the Governor who 
appoints the Political Agents in each tribal agency. In 2002 the Governor also set up the FATA 
Secretariat in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to oversee development planning in the tribal areas. Thus, 
enforcement of this option has the benefit of FATA already being linked to the administration in 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The government can build upon those links which will be easier than 
establishing a government structure from scratch in the tribal areas. However, the effectiveness of 
this alternative as far as tackling FATA’s economic problems is uncertain. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has 
development issues of its own and maintains the lowest human development indicators in 
comparison to every province in Pakistan. 
Adding an under-developed tribal territory to an already strained government may not yield 
optimum results. The religious party known as MMA (Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal) has been able to 
exercise significant influence in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and it was the leading party until 2008 when 
the secular ANP won. Efforts should be made to move FATA away from radicalization and 
militancy. By joining the tribal areas to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, there is a risk of adding to the existing 
disorder of the province.  
Separate provincial status for FATA: In October 2010, elders from all seven tribal agencies 
attended a FATA convention in Peshawar and demanded a separate provincial status for FATA.100 
In interviews conducted by the American Foundation and Terror Free Tomorrow, when asked how 
FATA should be governed, seventy percent of FATA residents said it should become a separate 
province of Pakistan.101 Pakistan is divided into four provinces, one capital territory, two self-
governing autonomous regions and the Tribal Areas. A separate provincial status would make 
FATA the fifth province of Pakistan. FATA is a tribal society and roughly 3.17 million people of the 
area have the same language, culture and traditions.102 A smaller separate province of FATA will be 
more manageable than an even larger province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The government may 
encounter fewer roadblocks if they choose to start anew rather than attempting to merge tribes with 
the already established structure in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.  
If FATA is given a separate provincial status, then Southern Punjab, Hazara, and parts of 
Baluchistan will reason that they deserve a similar status as well. For example the non-Pashtun, 
Hazara population is a separate ethnic group with their own language in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. 
When the name of NWFP was changed to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in April 2010, riots and protests 
broke out because the Hazara population did not feel represented by the new name. Unlike FATA, 
however, these groups already belong to a province and have an established status. Any change in 
their status will have to be done through the instrument of the constitution and a 2/3rd majority in 
the parliament will have to ratify such a change.  
Political acceptability of this option is excellent since the inhabitants of FATA have demanded a 
separate provincial status rather than a merger with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Added likelihood of 
success will come from the people having a sense of ownership in their new province rather than 	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being forced into less popular situations. This option will be effective in countering the spread of 
militancy and radicalization because access to a government funded education would provide 
impoverished parents with more palliative option to radical madrassas. The real challenge of this 
alternative is going to be enforcement since any new government will have to start from the ground 
up. A concerted approach from the population and long term steady support from a stable central 
government will be essential to bring FATA into the fold. 
In theory, funds will be allocated for education, infrastructure, and eventually new commerce. At the 
moment US funds are being used to undertake some development projects in FATA such as road 
construction. In 2010 the US pledged $750 million, spread over five years, to support infrastructure, 
health, education, job creation, and other economic projects in FATA.103 The United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) also has many small projects to develop basic water 
infrastructure and power systems.104 The Pakistan government has an opportunity to expand upon 
these projects and ramp up their efforts to provide basic amenities to improve upon the quality of 
life in FATA. Not until basic infrastructure is in place to support growth and commerce will FATA 
have the ability to generate significant revenue through taxation.  
 
Recommendation 
The status quo is the dire state which needs to be addressed in FATA; as Governor Ghani said, 
militancy in the tribal area has exposed many weaknesses and shortcomings in the current political 
and administrative system. Implementation of President Zardari’s reforms will not address the 
political status of FATA and it will remain a tribal territory. By amending the FCR and allowing 
political parties to function in the tribal areas, short-term benefits may be produced. On the other 
hand, this policy will do little to improve upon the low human development indicators and 
increasing militancy and radicalization. 
A merger with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa would provide a preliminary economic base for FATA to 
develop on. However, the interests of influential religious parties in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are in 
direct conflict with those of many FATA residents. A vulnerable and largely illiterate population of 
FATA makes an easy target for extremism. For those reasons, a separate provincial status for FATA 
is recommended. Making FATA into a province of its own will allow the Pakistani government to 
start afresh in the region. A stable administration will have to be created in order to develop roads, 
courts and police stations.  
Under Article 247 (6) of the Pakistan constitution, the President has the power to declare the entire 
or part of FATA as a non-tribal area provided that he determines the views of the tribes through a 
jirga.105 This article also allows the president to take any consequential action necessary after 
declaring FATA a non-tribal area. FATA residents desire progress, developmental projects, 
infrastructure and education. They demand that the constitution should be extended to the tribal 
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areas.106 Therefore the current instrument of governance, Loi Jirga (large Jirga), should be used to 
move forward until the region is up to par with the rest of the country.   
The FCR has surpassed its useful life and should be abolished. An evolutionary approach should be 
taken in removal of the regulation since the goal will realistically take several years to achieve. A 
sudden change in FATA will lead to problems. For example, the FCR was abolished overnight in 
Swat and was immediately followed by anarchy in the Valley. Similarly, when the princely states of 
Swat, Dir, Chitral and Malakand were merged with mainstream Pakistan in 1969 without proper 
preparation, the resulting poor governance led to public dissatisfaction. The discord eventually 
progressed into a full-fledged insurgency. In order to avoid repeating those mistakes, a measured 
plan is required for FATA to ensure that the tribal population has time to adjust to each phase of 
the process.  
 
Conclusion 
The situation in Pakistan must be viewed as an opportunity to bring FATA under the constitution 
and at par with the rest of the country. A higher state presence will ensure the security and 
development of the region. Success of this option would lie largely in the hands of the people. A 
unified voice will go far in determining whether FATA is awarded provincial status or if it is merged 
with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Regardless of the choice, FATA residents are long overdue for equal 
status as Pakistani citizens. The cost of keeping FATA trapped in the past is becoming too high to 
bear.  
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Appendix: Polling Data from FATA 
The charts on the next page show that FATA residents reject Al Qaeda and the Taliban, as well as 
the religious political party, Jamaat-e-Islami. Former cricketer Imran Khan’s, secular political party, 
Tehreek-e-Insaf has the most support in the region (Source: New America Foundation and Terror 
Free Tomorrow107). 
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